China Heads South

After years of yoke under colonialism, most African countries became independent in the 1960s. At the beginning of that decade, the then British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to what was happening in Africa as a new "wind of change." And his was a precise observation; for just one year after Macmillan's Cape Town pronouncement, 17 African states had wrestled power from the colonialists. The thirst for freedom seemed unquenchable.

However, upon independence, most young states were confronted by monstrous challenges. There was the arduous task of internal nation building while at the same time seeking ways to provide assistance in liberating other countries that were still sweltering under colonial powers.

From a global viewpoint, anti-war campaigns were being launched, and civil rights activists were hitting the streets. Student demonstrations and nationalist movements were making an impact that could not be ignored. Popular culture was emerging and universities, initially considered ivory towers and bastion of objective inquiry, became venues of socio-cultural and political strategies.

The emerging nations in Africa had grotesque hurdles placed on their way to development by their former masters. The Cold War had already become a significant determinant in orienting ideological positioning in global politics. Therein lay the dilemma that free African countries faced: to either ideologically identify with the West or with the Left.

Having freed themselves from the European capitalists, young African countries radically resisted the temptation of joining the communist European hegemony. This led to a "third force" in global socio-cultural politics. When French demographer Alfred Sauvy, a French demographer described emergence of the “third force” as the “third world,” in an article in the L'Observateur in 1952, he must have correctly read the signs of time.

The third force was however faced with enormous challenges: competition and intimidation from stronger foreign states and especially former masters, a cutthroat global market and rigidity of an internal single party political system. Inability of the third force to have an impact in the world market led to introduction of neocolonial oppression in form of global corporate and multinationals.

With the collapse of the Soviet communism in 1989, and the ascent of the United States as the sole superpower, global socio-cultural and econo-political dynamics took an unprecedented twist. Although, the US has continued to participate in development programs in other parts of the world, development studies have suggested the viability of South-South co-operation. Probably, the emergence of China as a development partner with African countries can be examined as an intriguing phenomenon from this standpoint.

Despite its communist political orientation; China has cancelled more than $10 billion of the debt it is owed by African states. During the 2^nd Sino-Africa business conference in 2003, China offered further debt relief to thirty-one African countries. It also facilitated the opening of the prospect of zero-tariff trade. Only three years earlier, President Jiang Zemin has clearly stated China’s willingness to cooperate with Africa. When opening The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, president Zemin recommended that both China and Africa should “take part in international affairs on the basis of equality and in an enterprising spirit. China and African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of developing countries will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries will be effectively safeguarded.”

China’s cooperation with Africa has created new opportunities just as it has generated new challenges for Africa. The significance of China’s renewed engagement with Africa over the last five years is stronger than ever before: from oil fields in the north to the mines of Central Africa, to the farms in the south.

In matters financial, between 2002 and 2003, trade between China and Africa witnessed a growth of 50 per cent, to $18.5 billion according to Chinese Officials. Last year, it had grown to more than $25 billion. According to a report in The Christian Science Monitor, China, being the second world largest oil importer behind United Stated, “has oil interests in Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon. The US is also hunting for oil in Africa, with about 10 percent of imports coming from the continent.”

Whether that is controversial is neither nor there. But one thing is certain: China is also involved in activities that are not contentious. Under the backing of the UN, the China-Africa Business Council was opened - and headquartered in China- to improve trade and development. It has sent peacekeepers to Liberia, and has contributed to construction projects in, among other countries, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia.

However, there is a vibrant debate on Chinese involvement in African issues, and whether its objective is to exploit immense African resources. China’s willingness to trade and offer aid without political conditionalities is widely appreciated by some Africa’s politicians and policy makers. Its presence as an alternative source of global power may be seen as providing global bipolarity in which African and other developing countries will have a greater role on the global matters.

Arguably, China is a successful alternative to the West in the eyes of Africa. For many political leaders in Africa, China is a living proof of “successful’ alternatives to western political and economic models. However, critics are concerned that China’s presence in Africa could help sustain questionable regimes like Robert Mugabe's autocratic 27-year reign in Zimbabwe. The reference to China’s economic prosperity by autocratic regimes in Africa to justify their stifling of political liberalization and competitive economy makes China- Africa cooperation even multifarious. As recent as last year, Beijing comfortably rolled out a red carpet for Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe. The west was incensed.

Despite China’s increasing partnership with African countries profound concerns from various local human rights organizations and non-governmental organizations, and Western commentators is clear. The fear is whether China’s cooperation with African countries will deter advancement of human rights and democracy in the continent.

The western capitals, for instance have pointed an accusing finger at China alleging its support of the Sudanese government. It is alleged that China is behind the military regime that is associated with the ongoing genocide in Darfur. China is also accused of hindering United Nations Security Council efforts to effectively address the Sudanese government’s role in the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region.

China has revealed it intentions to veto any sanctions imposed against Sudan. When the United Nations Security Council tabled a motion in September to punish Sudan for failing to stop human rights abuse in the violent region of Darfur, it was compelled to water down the proposal to avoid a Chinese veto.

While shareholders of Western companies may be cautious about investing in state-led energy projects in African countries which rely on a repressively-enforced stability, such issues seemingly have little effects on the Chinese visibility to the Chinese public. This presents huge challenges for human rights advocates in Africa.

It is now possible for “countries to get aid and investment without improving on human rights and democracy issues,” according to Chen-Shen Yen, a researcher at Taiwan’s Institute of International Relations. “China’s money comes with no strings attached. Aid from the West is full of conditions, but the question about the Chinese role now is whether the resources of these countries is in the hands of poor regimes or whether the whole country benefits.”

According to He Wenping, director of the African studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing, China and Africa share the view that countries should not meddle in each other’s affairs. “We don’t believe that human rights should stand above Sovereignty,” he stated.

As China’s influence in Africa grows, will its voice gain a crescendo in African political affairs? China-Africa security cooperation is particularly unnerving to some Western capitals. Chinese-made arms are often cheaper than Western rivals, and China does not usually impose political, human rights or humanitarian conditions in its arms sales. For instance, the Nigerian government is steadily reaching to China for weapons to deal with the troubling insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Nigeria air force purchased twelve Chinese-made versions of the improved Mig 21 jet fighter; the navy has ordered patrol boats to check any incursion into the Niger creeks by the insurgents. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe’s ‘Look East Policy’ has bought six more fighter jets from the Chinese government.

On the other end, the Chinese government has begun to deploy five hundred troops in the West African State of Liberia, in its biggest ever contribution to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. However, many argue that the deployment is believed to be a result of the new Liberia government recent decision to open diplomatic relations with Beijing at the expense of its rival Taiwan.

Although South –south cooperation is arguably salutary, one may consider examining South African President, Thambo Mbeki’s fear whether current China’s investment is a new wave of economic colonialism. Whether south-south cooperation we are witnessing is less self-interested than the dominant western investment remains a challenging question